Introduction

With the sheer amount of hazardous chemicals and pathogenic strains present in the laboratory, lab safety is undoubtedly of utmost importance to ensure responsible research practice. Beyond that, to ensure B.Max’s viability as a solution to harmful biofilms, it is necessary to consider ways to address concerns regarding its safety. Hence, this page is dedicated to the safety measures taken to minimise risk in the lab, as well as the steps taken to ensure B.Max can be safely applied in the real world. For more information on our safety procedures, click here for our safety form.

Many thanks to the Department of Genetics and the Department of Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology for lending us lab space to carry out our experiments!

Lab Safety

Due to space constraints, our lab work is divided among three departments, namely the Department of Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology, Genetics and Chemistry. Nonetheless, safety precautions have been taken in all locations.


I. Safety Equipment

Firstly, all of the labs are well-equipped with various safety features, in case of any accidents:

  • Fire extinguishers
  • Eyewash station
  • Spill kits
  • Safety shower
  • First-aid kits
  • Fumehoods
  • Biosafety cabinets

II. Waste Disposal Protocols

Biological and chemical wastes were both deposited into labelled bottles and plates accordingly, and we had separate bins for different purposes, including general waste, biohazards and sharps. All waste were subsequently taken care of by the Health, Safety and Environment Office (HSEO).


III. General safety training

Conducted by Emily Kempin (Department of Genetics), Alexander Carvell and Dr Hassan (Department of Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology), Dr Sivan Nir-Luz (Yusuf Hamied Department of Chemistry)

For all of the departments, we attended online safety courses specific to each. For instance, the fire safety course taught us the operation of different fire extinguishers and relevant contact details for each department in case of an emergency, as well as introduced fire emergency protocols.

Other safety courses gave an introduction to the department, lab access and rules, relevant safety personnel (including the departmental safety officer and fire safety manager) and the risks and hazards in the lab.

Once the online courses had been completed, we were given a physical introduction to the laboratory, as well as an explanation of waste disposal procedures and ways to report safety hazards, accidents, incidents and near misses in the lab.

Additionally, a physical walk of escape routes in case of fires was conducted, followed by a location of fire extinguishers and blankets, as well as a demonstration of emergency door release mechanisms.


IV. General Wet Lab Training

Conducted by Kavi Shah (instructor), Hassan Rahmoune (Department of Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology), Shella Jeniferiani Willyam (Yusuf Hamied Department of Chemistry)

To ensure safe usage of lab equipment, we were also given general wet lab training for skills we were unfamiliar with. For instance, we were taught how to operate the bio-safety cabinet, sterilisation procedures and various microbial and biochemical techniques.


V. General safety in the lab:

  • COSHH forms were approved and signed
  • Appropriate PPE were worn: gloves, lab coats, goggles
  • Adherence to waste disposal protocols
  • Use of the flow hood and proper aseptic techniques

Product Safety

Biocontainment: Overview

Whilst B. subtilis is generally recognised as safe and is already used as a probiotic for humans, plants, and animals, it is important that our engineered strain does not end up where it was not designed to be and possibly cause unintended consequences. Additionally, although our engineered strain is designed to minimise the probability of invasion, over time there is the possibility of these beneficial biofilms being invaded by pathogenic or corrosive microorganisms, which may then be difficult to remove during cleaning. Hence, we recognised the need for biocontainment to prevent unintended spread of B.Max, in addition to the need for inducible biofilm disruption (self-destruction) to allow for effective cleaning of any invading microbes (see Engineering).


Biocontainment - Preventing Unintended Spread

To prevent the unintended spread of B.Max, we considered 3 of the major biocontainment mechanisms – a toxin-based kill switch that results in toxin expression and cell death under certain condtions, engineered auxotrophy that only allows cells to survive in the presence of supplemented nutrients, or conditional expression of essential genes under certain conditions. As B.Max may be broadly applied over large surfaces with varying nutrient compositions, engineered auxotrophy did not appear to be reasonable in this case. Additionally, when considering the long-term evolutionary stability of the biocontainment mechanism (i.e. how easy it is to break it), toxin-based kill switches appear significantly less evolutionarily stable (i.e. easier to break) than conditional essential genes. Hence, we decided to utilise conditional essential genes for this biocontainment mechanism.

As B.Max is intended to survive only in the biofilm-associated state, we decided to design a biocontainment mechanism that allows biofilm-associated cells to survive, but results in the death of planktonic cells. To do so, we considered utilising the biofilm master regulator in B. subtilis, SinR – SinR binds to an operator region upstream of the promoter of genes involved in biofilm formation, repressing expression of these genes during the planktonic state. During the planktonic-to-biofilm transition, SinR is sequestered by SinI, preventing binding of SinR to the operator regions and allowing for expression of biofilm-associated genes. Hence, adding a SinR-binding operator region upstream of the promoter of an essential gene may allow for the desired biocontainment mechanism of survival in biofilm-assocaited state and death in planktonic state.

However, a single SinR-binding operator region upstream of the promoter of a single essential gene also appears evolutionarily unstable (i.e. it could be easily broken by disruption of the SinR-binding operator region). To increase the evolutionary stability of this biocontainment mechanism, we considered adding multiple binding sites for SinR, and binding sites for other transcription factors involved in biofilm formation, upstream of the promoters of multiple essential genes. From this, the probability of all binding sites being disrupted for all of the conditional essential genes would appear to be very low.

As B. subtilis would be planktonic during culturing and application, in this biocontainment system the cells would die prior to being able to form a biofilm. Hence, we considered inserting an additional copy of the essential gene at a different site in the genome, expressed under an inducible promoter. This would effectively form an AND gate for survival, where cells have to either be in the presence of an inducer (which could be provided during culturing) or in the biofilm-associated state.

To identify the optimal essential genes to conditionally express, we analysed the BsubCyc database for every essential gene in B. subtilis to identify those which have annotated promoter regions supported by experimental evidence and contain only a single gene under the control of that promoter (to avoid unintentionally making other genes conditional). From this, we identified gyrA, gltX, and rpsD as promising candidates.

For designing the operator region, we decided to utilise the naturally-occuring operator regions upstream of the eps and tapA-sipW-tasA operons (encoding the major polysaccharide and protein components of the biofilm matrix, respectively). These operator regions are well-documented based on experimental evidence, hence it was possible to design constructs to insert these operator regions upstream of the promoter of the essential genes, with the same distance between the operator elements and transcription start site that occurs in the eps and tapA-sipW-tasA operons.



Biocontainment - Inducible Biofilm Disruption

To allow for effective removal of B.Max and any invading microbes during cleaning, we considered the optimal mechanisms for inducible biofilm disruption. Whilst there is data supporting biofilm disruption by application of the DNase, DNase I, and the protease, proteinase K, these are eukaryotic proteins which are unlikely to function optimally in B. subtilis. Instead, we considered other proteins, such as the bacterial DNase, NucB, the bacterial proteases, NprB and Bpr, and the bacterial racemase, YlmE. Expression of some combination of these proteins following application of an inducer may result in significant amounts of biofilm disruption to allow for effective cleaning.

Safety during Outreach

Safety during Biomakespace

While we wanted to show the participants at the Biomakespace meeting the sporulation knockout strains we produced, we had to ensure that the microscope slides were properly sealed and safely transferred to the location of the meeting. Since there is no biological waste management at Makespace, nor are there proper lab spaces, we had our strain risk assessed as well.